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Introduction 
  
In 2012, John M. Hobson published his brilliant and exciting book ‘The 
Eurocentric Conception of World Politics’ in which he meticulously exposes 
the paternalism, Eurocentrism and racism in the thinking of the great scholars 
of the international since 1760.  
 
The thinkers that feature in the book like Mill, Kant, his own ancestor Hobson, 
Spencer, Pearson, Lenin, Stoddard, Mackinder, Wilson, Cobden, Marx, but 
also the more contemporary Morgenthau, Carr, Keohane, Bull, Gramsci, 
Wallerstein, Cox, Cooper, Ikenberry, Kagan, Ignatieff, Fukuyama, Huntington, 
Krazner, Held, Nussbaum, Wheeler, Finnemoore, Rawls, Vincent, Donnell and 
others, collectively indeed form what is generally considered the 
authoritative canon on the International. Their thinking continues to be 
passed on as such in most IR courses today, thus making John’s critical 
historiography all the more relevant in the present. 
 
The importance of the wealth on information and insight in Hobson’s 
painstakingly thorough work can hardly be overestimated, for mainstream 
and (postcolonial) critical scholarship alike. It is nevertheless striking how 
Hobson limits his framing of racism to the scientific and biological; a move 
which allows him to conclude that racism is no longer an appropriate 
framework through which to understand the scholarship after 1945. With Hitler 
sawing death and destruction in Europe on these grounds before and during 
the Second World War, and given the outcome of that war, the ideas around 
biologically superior and inferior races are seen – not just by Hobson – to have 
lost all legitimacy as a scholarly categorization and ranking of human kind. 
 
At the same time though, he does not necessarily claim that racism and – 
following his definition – other forms of systematic hierarchising, exclusion and 
violence against particular groups of people has come to an end in 
everyday life. But, in line with the perceived delegitimation of scientific racism 
after 1945, Hobson opts for labelling the continued expressions of superiority 
and varied ensuing practices and thought in international relations as 
Eurocentrism. Given that Hobson does not deny that the societal processes of 
prejudices mixed with disproportionate (structural) power, continue to 
systematically cause discrimination, violence and death to groups of people 
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on the basis of certain of their qualities considered inferior or undesirable, – 
thus operating along similar lines and logics of scientific racism –, are still alive 
and well, it is all the more remarkable that he then dismisses it as a valid 
analytical category for the post 1945 present.  
 
It is the contention of this essay that, precisely given the daily, structural 
racism that unmistakably continues to plague our societies – people literally 
encountering death, destruction and discrimination they would not had they 
been ‘white’ – it is both analytically and normatively near impossible to be at 
peace with the premature declaration of the end of scientific/biological 
racism as a prism through which to understand contemporary knowledge 
production on the (inter)national.  
 
The question at hand in this commentary is not whether Eurocentrism in its 
varied manifestations as meticulously developed in Hobson’s book is not a 
valid and insightful analytical category to understand the contemporary 
scholarship and world, because it is. What is at stake here is how this 
Eurocentrism relates to the category of racism and what the consequences 
are when the two are presented as separate rather than one (Eurocentrism) 
as one of the manifestations of the other (racism). 
 
A first question that arises from John Hobson’s analytical choice in the 
context of continued racist (scientific and other)1 practices and thoughts in 
the everyday is: How can it be that academia would be miraculously cured 
from a sickness that continues to befall John, Jane, Mamadou and Mariam 
Doe on a daily basis? In other words, if racism, even in Hobsons narrow 
scientific (related to eugenics and Darwinism) understanding of it, continues 
to systematically feature in everyday life, can it be that this occurs in the 
absence of a base for it in our contemporary scholarship? 
 
Secondly – given that Hobson is most certainly not a lone wolf in his 
reluctance to deploy the racism label, or the R-word, in the present – which 
structural knowledge production patterns can be discerned in the 
contemporary debate that allow for the R-word to be so contentious or 
almost compulsively written out of the narrative or analysis and what existing 
power structure does this reluctance serve? 
 
This commentary will focus mostly on the second question. With regard to the 
first one, it can overall be considered as a call for the revalorisation of the 
everyday in our reflexions on scholarship as well as analytical choices, rather 
                                            
1 Even though providing a precise definition of what racism is or is not, is not the aim here – 
the focus is rather on the normative implications of strategic definitional choices in the use or 
not of the racism label – broadly speaking, I understand racism as the societal processes, 
including systems of thought, of prejudices mixed with disproportionate (structural) power, 
that systematically cause discrimination, violence and death to groups of people on the 
basis of certain of their qualities considered inferior or undesirable. In it in this sense that I 
would consider Eurocentrism a manifestation of racism.  
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than that it will present airtight proof of the continued existence of racism in 
society or scholarship. Mostly because I do not think that this is the discussion 
to be had with Hobson’s invaluable work, as it does not necessarily contest 
such fact, not in the least because its ethos is fundamentally anti-racist.  
 
With regard to the second question on the power of the reluctance to use 
the R-word – essentially a meta-question – the commentary seeks to develop 
some answers by shedding a decolonial light on both everyday life and 
scholarly knowledge production practices in an attempt to transcend the 
individual bias in the R-debate and revalorise the historical and structural 
stakes at hand in that conversation.  
 
Decoloniality as a research option or strategy, put forward among others by 
the likes of Walter Mignolo, Rolando Vázquez, Maria Lugones, Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres, Ramón Grosfoguel and developed and applied in IR by 
scholars like Robbie Shilliam, Meera Sabaratnam, Julia Suárez-Krabbe, 
Branwen Gruffyd Jones (this list is by no means exhaustive) can be – very 
crudely – summarised in a triple call of de-mythologising, de-silencing and 
anti-colonially de-colonising our knowledge production or cultivation 
practices.  
 
Concretely and in this context, these strategies – presented separately for 
analytical purposes but in practice very much interlinked – address the 
following questions: Blind spots: What part of the story is systematically left 
out? How are connected histories invariably fragmented or distorted? (de-
mythology) Whose stories and experiences are systematically ignored, 
muted, not heard, delegitimised? In other words, who does not get the 
microphone, is not around the expert table, and why? (de-silencing) Finally, 
why does any of this matter, i.e. what is their relation to the colonial status 
quo, i.e. both their political and material significance, and how to alter this? 
(de-colonising) 
 
So, in line with the concerns expressed in the second question, rather than a 
debate over facts in John Hobson’s seminal work on scientific racism and 
Eurocentric institutionalism, this essay is an explicitly normative conversation 
and engagement with today’s anything but new or isolated reluctance to 
use racism as a lens to understand the post-1945 world. The aim here is to 
draw attention to the fact that analytical categories, apart from imperfect 
attempts to render reality intelligible, are a deeply normative enterprise that 
implicitly or explicitly seek to render (parts of) reality for a certain purpose. 
Under scrutiny here is the extent to which R-word reluctance (dis)serves an 
anti-racist decolonial purpose. 
 
Building on a vignette of the yearly racism-related debate around the figure 
of Zwarte Piet or Black Pete in contemporary Flanders, Belgium, this 
contribution fundamentally questions the salience of avoiding the use of the 
R-word in public debates and IR alike for strategic reasons and casts a light 
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on how it operates in maintaining a colonial status quo, and if and to what 
extent John Hobson’s analytical choices unwillingly are a part of this.  
 
It is important to note that a strategic reluctance, as showcased by John 
Hobson, distinguishes itself in fundamental ways from others’ fundamental 
reluctance. The latter a) do not necessarily promote an anti-racist ethos 
and/or b) question the mere existence of racism in the contemporary world 
as such. John Hobson’s work is not that.  
 
In a way I challenge his, what I call here strategic, reluctance precisely 
because I see it in stark contrast with the deeply critical and anti-racist ethos 
at the heart of his work. Strategic reluctance in this sense is characterised by 
a desire to avoid ascribing delegitimised intentions, like racism, to individuals 
when they did not have them. The priority in such reflections is not to offend 
or alienate certain participants from the conversation on structural injustice 
that is nevertheless seen to be crucial to have. Analytically limiting the hated 
R-category to scientific or biological racism only, is one concrete 
manifestation of this strategic reluctance.  
Vignette: innocence and racism in the Zwarte Piet tradition 
Every year, around December 5th and 6th the Santa Claus-like figure Saint 
Nicolas, sails into the ports of Netherlands and Flanders from Spain to bring 
toys and sweets to the children. 
 
In this Low Lands traditional, Saint Nicolas is accompanied by the figure of 
Zwarte Piet or Black Pete. This character is embodied by a small army of 
black-faced individuals sporting a renaissance outfit from the times Spain 
ruled over the region, with typical afro-wigs, feathered hats, red lipstick and 
hoop earrings.  
 
Zwarte Piet’s role is twofold: he – in true slave narrative style of the time – firstly 
functions as Saint Nicolas’ help, carrying the bags with toys and distributing 
sweets to the kids. His second role, very much in line with the tried bogey-man 
trope set aside for men of African descent, is to scare children into good 
behaviour throughout the year.  The story – passed on generationally through 
the many Saint Nicolas children songs – goes that Black Pete will throw the 
bad kids in his empty bag and/or beat them with a rod.  
In recent decades he has been more benignly rebranded in the other tell-
tale trope of the silly, jokey, broadly smiling black minstrel whose role it is to 
make children laugh. 
 
Until recently, every child in the Netherlands and Flanders grew up with this 
tradition, without them or their parents linking it to anything remotely to do 
with racism. Not even I, a second generation Rwandan, black, Flemish kid 
growing up in Antwerp. Even the fact that I, when it was our turn in the last 
year of high school to dress up like Black Pete for the primary school kids, did 
not need to blacken my face, or that as an adult, every year around 
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December, my sister and I would have small children fearfully look at us in the 
street, did not stop me from embracing the collective Flemish innocence 
around this Zwarte Piet and Sinterklaas tradition. 
 
Today we see this innocence being challenged. Less than five years ago a 
handful of people in Flanders, taking queue from activists in the Netherlands, 
started to point at the racist elements contained in this tradition and call for a 
ban or modification of the practice. This has stirred a yearly, invariably bitter 
yet still relatively marginal public conversation on racism in local traditions.  
 
This Flemish attempt at a debate around the place of the figure of Black Pete 
in present-day Belgium and the Netherlands invariably showcases a set of 
biases, recurrent in most R-word debates, that illuminate the three decolonial 
points this commentary seeks to make on the reluctance to use racism as an 
analytical category: 1) the individualised bias of innocence and intentionality 
and intensity, 2) the bias of expertise and legitimacy, 3) the bias of the 
emotional and anecdotal at the expense of the structural. In what follows, 
the aim in is to scrutinise the different ways in which also strategic reluctance, 
as contained in Hobson’s analytical choices, unwillingly ends up reproducing 
similar biases or not. 
One: |De-mythology| The individualised bias of innocence, 
intentionality and intensity 
 
‘How can a children’s tradition be racist?’ 
‘It was not meant to be racist – hence it is not racism.’ 
 
These utterances, and the unspoken feeling that ‘if it doesn’t look like 
something Hitler would have done, it’s not racism’, are some of the most 
recurrent objections when people have attempted to label something as 
racist. The Black Pete tradition context is just an example in which the 
element of innocence is particularly explicit.  
 
In every-day life, an innocent children’s tradition like Black Pete can never be 
racist. First of all, because of the clearly benign intentions of those that 
celebrate the tradition; secondly because of the fact that the potential 
representational harm done to people of African descent in such context is 
deemed incomparable to the horrors of the quintessential trope of racism all 
of us in the industrialised West grew up with: the Hitlerian moment.  
 
The Hitlerian connotation attached to the racism label reduces it not only to 
a matter of good versus bad intentions, it also individualises a problem that is 
essentially a structural problem that operates at times through individual 
behaviour and powerful structures alike. 
 
What, then, is the connection with the need to demythologise our knowledge 
production practices? In the context of a society that clearly bears the marks 
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of continued systematic exclusion and violence against people based on 
their appearance or affiliation, the only way these biases of individuality, 
innocence, intention and intensity continue to make sense to people, is 
through a knowledge production system, and hegemonic historiography in 
particular, that sustains partial, fragmented and distorted understanding of 
how, where and to what end racism operates. In Western Europe we have 
reduced it to the acts of evil, probably lunatic, men – Hitler on top – but most 
importantly, they are considered exceptional aberrations.  
 
It is in this mythological context of individual responsibility, malevolence or 
innocence, and the disconnection between representational racist violence 
and mass atrocities that labelling contemporary actions, discourses or lines of 
thought as racist, is often seen as an impediment to constructive dialogue. A 
systematic individualised approach to racism through the figure of ‘the evil 
racist’, leaves us with an incapacity to have an open and constructive 
engagement with this system of, by definition, racialised coloniality, i.e. a 
matrix of power that allows for the normalisation and perpetuation extreme 
power inequalities, allowing for systematic dispossession, violence and even 
death of racialised peoples.   
 
Whereas first and foremost features of the fundamental reluctance, the 
individuality, innocence and intentionality tropes are also embraced in 
strategic reluctance considerations when the use of the R-word is linked to 
the fear of hurting certain people’s feelings or an impediment to a structural 
conversation. It is on this basis that the strategic reluctant, like John Hobson2, 
is uncomfortable to use the category of racism as an analytical tool to study 
the works of contemporaries like Keohane as to not to offend them.  
 
In his book, John Hobson showcases his anti-colonial or -racist commitment 
by opting for the term Eurocentric institutionalism to pinpoint in more detail 
what is going on in post 1945 scholarship. The point is not that this is a wrong 
descriptor, because it is not. What is more, there is true value in the 
sophisticated and detailed study of this Eurocentric institutionalism and I will 
surely use this analytical tool in my own work and teaching.  
 
The question at hand in the reluctant R-word debate is how this Eurocentrism 
is related to racism. Why is it presented as a different category all together 
rather than maybe a manifestation of racism, particular to the post 1945 era? 
                                            
2 John’s first concern, especially in his book, is of analytical nature, as he seeks to create the 
necessary space in which Eurocentrism can be clearly seen and discussed, something that, 
according to him, the blanket racism label does not allow us to do. An additional concern 
though, permeating his interventions (during debates and roundtables, or e.g. on the The 
Disorder of Things blog forum on his book 
(https://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/10/23/eurocentrism-racism-whats-in-a-word-a-
response-to-bowden-sabaratnam-and-vucetic/) ), is how the people – dead or alive – 
featuring in his work, would view the racist label being cast on their thinking, and take 
offence.  
7 
 
 
If this strategic reluctance contributes to a perpetuation of the fundamental 
reluctants’ distorted image of what racism is actually about, where does that 
leave our anti-racist scholarly ethos? Is it not important to further document 
and endlessly repeat that more than individual malevolence or lunacy, 
racism is the oil in the system of colonial power that makes a sustained 
discrimination of and violence against certain people not only possible but 
also invisible and acceptable? At the same time, when we speak of hurt 
feelings and intentionality, whose feelings are we systematically valuing more 
than others’ in our strategic reluctance? How does this play into the colonial 
status quo and the expendability of certain experiences and lives? 
This question brings us two the second leg of this decolonial commentary on 
the R-debate: that of the need to more systematically consider issues of 
silencing. 
Two: |De-silence| the bias of expertise 
 
Who are the experts? 
 
Even though the initial contestation around the Black Pete figure was 
launched by groups and individuals from the affected visible minority 
communities, the experts invited for a seat at the table in the Flemish Zwarte 
Piet discussion tend to invariably be members of the white male majority: 
historians, scholars in ethics or political representatives of ‘the people’. These 
unlikely experts on racism are then the solely trusted agents to define what 
constitutes as racism and what not. Their diagnosis is too often that it is not 
racism because it was not intended as such, or the selected historical 
evidence of the tradition does not support such claims.  
 
When visible minorities do make it around the table, it is to either talk back to 
these objections or to anecdotally expand on the emotional pain Zwarte Piet 
might cause them and their community. Even when this invitation to share 
the personal pain comes from a genuine place of interest and care, this 
particular type of interest or attempt at solidarity, unwillingly disqualifies them 
from being considered capable of objective overarching insights – still the 
key features of our conception of what good knowledge and expertise is all 
about. 
 
When we try to avoid offending people in the R-word conversation by 
avoiding using the label – it bears the question of how we value the life and 
sentiments of those people systematically on the receiving end of the racism 
– or, if you like, Eurocentric institutionalism. What makes it so acceptable that 
their experiences, intentions, feelings and suffering are always subordinate to 
that of those that occupy positions of privilege in the colonial racist matrix of 
power? 
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It is, among others, the systematic absence of the affected people around 
the expert-table of the R-word debate that makes ‘offending’ them or 
hurting their feelings more acceptable than the white majority and the 
experts it produces.  
 
An additional hurdle, specific to our scholarly engagements with the racism 
conversation, is that racism as a phenomenon is implicitly or explicitly not felt 
to be objective or analytical enough. And so, we bend over backwards to 
come up with other, more neutral and measurable concepts: inequality, 
discrimination, body/bio-politics, ethnocentrism, paternalism, imperialism, 
xenophobia, ignorance, … without necessarily considering to whom such 
move might be offensive. 
 
Can we not discern a similar bias in Hobson’s work when there is more 
concern with offending contemporary scholarship by using the R-word as an 
analytical category than with the very limited engagement with minority 
scholars throughout the book? We can hardly blame Hobson for the absence 
of a thorough engagement with alternative thinkers in the time frame under 
consideration, as it was clearly beyond the scope of this work that seeks to 
take the existing canon to task. It is nevertheless important to raise this issue if 
we seek to further anti-racist IR scholarship. We will fall short if we stop at 
merely denouncing what the mainstream scholars have been doing without 
digging up, fomenting alternative archives and elevating them to the level of 
the canonical, or, better yet, getting rid of the canonical thinking all 
together.  
It is only then, academically speaking, that offending a Keohane or Spivak 
will carry the same weight, but more importantly, that it will stop being the 
basis on which we choose to use the racism label or not. Rather than 
worrying about how it will be perceived by certain people, it will be the 
continued circumstances of coloniality and structural racism in the everyday 
that will be the guiding principle in how to analytically organise our study of 
the social and the international. 
Three: |De-colonise| the bias of the individual over the 
historical/structural  
 
What is all the fuss about? 
 
Another previously mentioned recurring objection put forward by the 
fundamental-reluctants in the Zwarte Piet R-word debate, is the fact that the 
issue is not serious enough to merit so much attention. This is due to the fact 
that the problem is identified as one of emotions and hurt feelings about 
things that happened in the past, cf. slavery. The hurt is therefore seen as 
something that can easily be overcome if one takes into account the lack of 
intentionality to cause pain in the present. Again, as mentioned before, these 
reflections are made possible through a distorted, fragmented presentation 
of past wrongs and their presumed irrelevance in the present. With slavery, 
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racism and colonialism being formally delegitimised in the present, our 
mythological knowledge production system sustains the belief that the 
practices have then also disappeared from the present everyday. Rarely, in 
the Zwarte Piet debate, is the connection made with the nature of Belgium’s 
continued engagement with its former colonies, or with the living conditions 
of people of African descent in Flanders: their structurally limited access to 
the labour, education and housing markets, their absence in representational 
positions of power cf. the media, teaching and politics; their over-
representation in incarceration and poverty statistics. 
 
It is important to reiterate that John Hobson’s work does not showcase the 
same bias. His painstakingly meticulous historiography of the scholarship on 
the international since 1760 up until 1945 most convincingly testifies to this. 
The question at this point then is: why is it so important that he does away with 
racism as an analytical category to understand the post 1945 scholarship if 
he clearly showcases a solid anti-colonial and anti-racist ethos throughout? 
  
The contention, of normative-strategic, rather than descriptive-analytical 
nature, of this commentary is that this is important, precisely because of the 
power of the Hitlerian moment – however distortedly (e.g. its exceptionality 
and individualised malevolence) this continues to be narrated to the masses. 
It is because of the presumed consensus around the unacceptability of 
categorising and hierarchizing peoples along racial lines, that failing to 
organise our analytical categories to understand structural injustices in the 
present, is a seriously missed opportunity in the present. This is where the 
ultimate legitimacy of the invocation of the label of racism lies. Not as a 
blanket accusation or obfuscating category that does not allow us to study 
the particularities of the different manifestations of these structural forms of 
exclusion and violence on certain groups of people (hence my genuine 
excitement about John Hobson’s development of the Eurocentrism category 
and its different manifestations), but as a form of violence that has indeed 
been delegitimised in the Western world after the Hitlerian moment. I believe 
that this is an advantage that from a normative standpoint, i.c. an anti-racist, 
anti-colonial ethos, should be embraced more seriously and systematically in 
our scholarly endeavours as well. 
 
In this reflection I have tried to fundamental question the tendency to make 
the R-debate about individual and group emotions, whether these are of the 
whitened masculinised majority or the visible minorities – it is about so much 
more than that; the legitimacy of its unabashed invocation lies precisely in 
the fact that it is about structural well-being and justice for the whole of 
society, something that can only be done by systematically taking the past 
and the past in the present seriously.  
 
Ultimately, if we are to focus on emotions (the day that the emotions of all 
are considered a legitimate source of knowledge on par with ratio I would be 
the first to do so) and hurt feelings in this debate, it is important to start 
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acknowledging that we have been prioritising the emotions and hurt feeling 
of the wrong group of people if we are truly concerned with the colonial 
matrix of power.  
Conclusion 
 
Hobson, and other strategic-reluctants within and outside academia, choose 
to avoid the term racism or restrict it to its scientific/biological meaning, to 
keep the door for dialogue open. The racism label being equated (both it its 
deployment and reception) to a personal charge – an insult to be avoided in 
a constructive dialogue –, priority is given to the importance of analytical 
accuracy, as to not put all manifestations of structural injustice on the same 
R-word pile.  These considerations pertain strategy, frameworks and choices 
we make in how we want to label reality, render it intelligible and maybe try 
to change it.  
 
The same goes for people like myself and others with me, who call for the 
explicit use of the term racism, both within and outside the scholarship. We 
maybe see racism as a main category with different manifestations. The 
systematic exclusion of and violence against people is not restricted to the 
biological, yet its effects tend to be as devastating or unwanted; because 
we still live it on a daily basis and it somehow seems impossible to think it 
away or beyond it – even when denied; because (individual) bad intentions 
do not explain the (persistence of) the phenomenon and it seems that a 
structural, collective vision of it would do a better job at describing this 
experienced reality. As most contemporaries, thanks to the Hitlerian moment, 
agree that racism is something bad invoking the label could in theory save us 
a lot a time, which we could use to focus straight away on strategies to fight 
it. In our scholarly thinking. In the policies that organise our everyday.   
 
Equally important though, is the realisation that neither of these positions is an 
objective rendering of reality. 
 
Invoking decoloniality in this meta debate on the R-word has served to firmly 
break with the myth of a) a binary division between the everyday and 
scholarship when it comes to understanding the sustained hierarchisation of 
peoples; b) scientific/biological racism that has been delegitimised beyond 
our discourses – if at all and c) racism being about a-historical individual 
Hitlerian malevolence. 
 
Secondly, it has sought to highlight the need to put the experiences and 
contributions of historically marginalised minorities, e.g. the perspectives of 
people and scholarship of colour, beyond the emotional testimonials, at the 
centre of such choices if we are to contribute to a radically different, anti- or 
non-racist IR and everyday. This desire is clearly reflected in Hobson’s work, 
yet in the absence of – for understandable reasons in this case – a sustained 
engagement with minority authors combined with his concern to offend 
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contemporary colleagues, his strategic reluctance to use the R-word 
unwillingly hampers the third decolonial concern of anti-colonial 
decoloniality that seeks both in scholarship and practice to contribute to a 
radical break with the colonial matrix of power of which structural racism, 
perpetuated among others in canonical scholarship, is a fundamental 
feature. 
 
Rather than seeking to proof that some of the post-1945 scholars featuring in 
Hobson’s book are racist or not, the aim in this commentary has been to 
weigh in on the content and teleology of the R-debate. The contention is 
that our choices of analytical categories, more than attempts to 
meaningfully describe reality, are/should be embraced as deeply normative 
enterprises as well, more or less consciously organising that reality for a 
certain purpose.  
 
The aim has been to break with the idea that analytical categories are 
merely attempts to capture an ‘objective’ reality out there; or can be 
reduced to peoples’ conscious intentions. Apart from systematic devices to 
understand reality, they are also understood as political or ideological 
choices on why we seek to understand which part of reality. 
Informed by a decolonial approach, which highlights the need for de-
mythologised, de-silenced and anti-colonially de-colonised knowledge 
production in the present, the essay has sought to argue that a strategic use 
of the R-word has an important role to play, as both a critical and analytical 
devise in the study of IR.  
